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Abstract 
Background: Semantic cognition depends on (a) semantic representations that code 
knowledge and (b) executive control processes that regulate access to this information such 
that relevant aspects are brought to the fore. It is not clear whether this second element, 
termed semantic control, draws on the same resources as executive processing in other 
domains.  
Aims: We investigated the degree of independence between semantic control and domain-
general executive function by studying non-semantic executive control in three patients who 
had semantic control deficits, and problems maintaining task-relevant conceptual knowledge 
in working memory.  
Methods: Patients completed (a) a phonological working memory task that manipulated 
executive demands and (b) a series of working memory tasks that loaded a variety of 
executive functions: namely, updating information, dividing attention and manipulating the 
contents of working memory. These tasks featured digits and letters, placing minimal 
demands on semantic processing.  
Results: While two patients displayed clear executive deficits on these non-semantic tasks, the 
third case (patient JB) showed fully intact non-semantic control, despite a clear control deficit 
for semantic tasks.  
Conclusions: This dissociation suggests that executive control over semantic knowledge relies 
on partially distinct neural mechanisms to those involved in domain-general control. 
 
Keywords: semantic control; semantic cognition; short-term memory; semantic aphasia; 
executive function 
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Introduction 
 Although investigations of semantic memory have predominately focused on its 
representational structure (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; A. J. Martin, 2007; Patterson, Nestor, 
& Rogers, 2007), in recent years there has been growing interest in the ways in which we 
access and manipulate these representations in the service of a particular goal or task (Badre 
& Wagner, 2002; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Koenig & Grossman, 2007; Thompson-
Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). Appropriate responses to stimuli in our 
environment require not only that we store information about their properties, but also that we 
bring relevant aspects of this information to the fore when needed and prevent irrelevant 
aspects from intruding. This control is necessary because objects are associated with a vast 
quantity of information and only a small subset of this knowledge is helpful at any one time. 
Consider, for example, the two tasks of playing a piano versus moving a piano across a room 
(Saffran, 2000). While both involve the same object, a different subset of its properties is 
germane to each task (functions of the keys and pedals in the former case; its size, weight, 
value and vulnerability to damage in the latter). Similar challenges arise in lexical-semantic 
processing. Many words have multiple meanings and to comprehend them the appropriate 
meaning must be retrieved based on the current context (Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005). 
Even words that are not strictly polysemous can have meanings that vary in different 
situations (e.g., compare “phases of child development” with “phases of the moon”; Hoffman, 
Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2011; Saffran, Bogyo, Schwartz, & Marin, 1980). Moreover, in 
expressive tasks (even highly constrained ones like object naming), selection between 
multiple potential responses is required (e.g., the family pet could be referred to as “animal”, 
“dog”, “Alsatian” or “Fido”; see also Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004). In other situations, 
aspects of an external stimulus must be ignored in order to focus on their deeper conceptual 
significance (e.g., the print on a newspaper is irrelevant when using it to swat a fly). 
Throughout this paper, we will refer to these processes of activating contextually-appropriate 
aspects of semantic knowledge and avoiding interference from irrelevant information as 
semantic control. 
 A fundamental issue in this research area is the following: what is the relationship 
between semantic control and other forms of executive control? To what extent are the neural 
systems that regulate semantic processing functionally independent from those that govern 
controlled processing in other domains, such as working memory and visual attention? A 
network of regions in dorsal prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex are implicated in controlled 
allocation of attention in a diverse range of tasks and have been termed “multiple demand” 
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regions (Cristescu, Devlin, & Nobre, 2006; Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlagger, & Petersen, 
2008; Duncan, 2006, 2010; Peers et al., 2005; Whitney, Kirk, o'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & 
Jefferies, 2012). These regions are often activated for tasks that tap semantic control, 
suggesting that controlled processing in the semantic domain relies in part on this domain-
independent system (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Collette, 
Hogge, Salmon, & Van der Linden, 2006; Nagel, Schumacher, Goebel, & D'Esposito, 2008; 
Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Rodd, et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill, et al., 1997; Wagner, 
Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). In contrast, other areas show a more selective 
response that is restricted to semantic control. For example, while the posterior portion of 
inferior prefrontal cortex (BA 44/9) responds to general cognitive control demands, the 
anterior aspects (BA 45/47) seem to be particularly important for semantic control (Gold & 
Buckner, 2002; Gough, Nobre, & Devlin, 2005; Nagel, et al., 2008; Snyder, Feigenson, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2007). In addition, posterior middle temporal gyrus is frequently activated 
in contrasts of high vs. low semantic control but is not thought to be important for executive 
processing for other types of task (Bedny, McGill, & Thompson-Schill, 2008; Gold et al., 
2006; Noppeney, Phillips, & Price, 2004; Rodd, et al., 2005; Whitney, Jefferies, & Kircher, 
2011; Whitney, Kirk, O'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2011). 
The emerging picture from these studies is that regulation of semantic knowledge 
depends on both domain-general multiple-demand regions and areas specialised for semantic 
control. It is not clear whether this partial neural specialisation can lead to a behavioural 
dissociation between semantic control and non-semantic executive control. In other words, 
are selective impairments of semantic control possible or is the semantic control network is 
sufficiently integrated with the general executive system that it cannot be disrupted 
independently? Here, we addressed this question by investigating executive control in 
multiple domains in patients with established semantic control deficits. In a series of studies, 
we have investigated patients with semantic control deficits following stroke (Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan, Jefferies, Corbett, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). Their profile, 
which we term “semantic aphasia” (SA), is characterised by multimodal semantic deficits that 
are highly sensitive to the cognitive control demands of the task being performed. For 
example, SA patients show poor comprehension of words with multiple meanings, in line 
with an inability to select from competing semantic representations. However, their 
performance improves when they are provided with contextual information that helps to 
resolve the ambiguity (Noonan, et al., 2010). They also have difficulty inhibiting aspects of 
semantic knowledge that are irrelevant to the current task. Noonan et al. demonstrated this 
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using a synonym matching task in which foils shared an irrelevant relationship with the probe 
(Samson, Connolly, & Humphreys, 2007). Accuracy declined when the foil was strongly 
related to the target (e.g., they found it difficult to match piece with slice in the presence of 
the distractor word cake). In general, SA patients are particularly poor at accessing 
appropriate knowledge in unconstrained or open-ended tasks, in which a range of responses 
are possible, but their performance improves when the task strongly directs them towards a 
particular response (Corbett, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2009, 2011; Hoffman, Jefferies, 
Ehsan, Hopper, & Lambon Ralph, 2009; Jefferies, Patterson, & Lambon Ralph, 2008; Soni et 
al., 2009). 
 In SA patients, semantic control deficits are concomitant with executive control 
impairments on a range of non-semantic tasks and the severity of their general executive  
impairment is significantly correlated with the severity of their semantic deficit (Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2006). One possibility is that these patients have a domain-independent 
control deficit that produces semantic and non-semantic deficits to similar degrees. However, 
since SA patients typically have large lesions affecting large swathes of frontal and/or 
temporoparietal cortex, it is also possible that multiple functional systems – some domain-
general and some semantic-specific – are affected. In addition, SA patients sometimes show 
additional deficits in input or output processing (e.g., in speech production or visual 
perception) that can affect performance across a range of tasks, making interpretation of the 
correlations difficult. 
 Recently, we have investigated three individuals who presented with a clear pattern of 
semantic control impairment but in a much “purer” form to that observed in SA (Hoffman, et 
al., 2009; Hoffman, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2011). These patients initially came to our 
attention because they had difficulty with verbal working memory tasks that required 
retention of semantic information – referred to as a semantic short-term memory (STM) 
deficit (R. C. Martin, Shelton, & Yaffee, 1994).
 
By directly comparing these patients to a 
case-series of SA patients, we were able to demonstrate that their working memory problems 
were the result of a more general control problem for semantic information, similar in form to 
that seen in SA (Hoffman, et al., 2009; Hoffman, Jefferies, et al., 2011). They showed the 
same effects of experimental manipulations of semantic control as SA patients, although the 
degree of impairment was much less severe. In fact, they performed within the normal range 
on tests typically used to diagnose semantic impairment; it was only when tested with tasks 
designed to tax semantic control heavily that their deficits became apparent. We hypothesised 
that these patients suffered from a relatively pure semantic control deficit and that the 
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semantic STM deficits observed as part of their profile arose because STM tasks tend to load 
heavily on executive control processes. 
 These three patients are unusual in the sense that they present with a clear semantic 
control deficit but have minimal perceptual and expressive difficulties. As such, they are a 
particularly suitable group in which to address the relationship between semantic and domain-
general executive control. In a previous study (Hoffman, et al., 2009), we found some weak 
evidence suggestive of non-semantic control deficits in two of these patients. Their 
performance on a battery of executive control tests was at the lower end, or on some tests 
slightly outside, the normal range for age-matched controls. In the present study we tested in 
greater detail the status of domain-general control functions in this set of patients. Our aim 
was to determine whether their apparently circumscribed semantic control impairment was 
accompanied by more general executive deficits. To achieve this, we employed more 
stringent tests of control taken from the working memory domain. Working memory tasks 
proved the most sensitive to semantic control deficits in this set of patients (Hoffman et al., 
2009, 2011a). This may be because they have high intrinsic executive control demands, given 
that they involve activation and online maintenance of a number of items simultaneously 
(Baddeley, 1996; Engle, 2002; Miyake et al., 2000) (see also Jefferies, Hoffman, Jones, & 
Lambon Ralph, 2008). We took two approaches to investigate non-semantic control. In 
Experiment 1, we varied executive demands in a phonological word detection task for which 
the meanings of the words were irrelevant. In Experiments 2-4 we employed digit and letter 
stimuli with minimal semantic content. Executive demands were changed by varying the need 
to update and manipulate the contents of working memory or to divide attention between two 
tasks. While we selected digits and letters for their lack of semantic associations, one aspect 
of letter processing, alphabetical ordering, does rely on stored knowledge. In Experiment 4, 
we made use of this fact to compare executive control relating to knowledge retrieval vs. 
executive manipulation of new information within the same task. 
 
Case Descriptions 
 The three patients tested have been described previously by Hoffman et al. (2009; 
2011). They were initially recruited on the basis that they showed semantic STM deficits, i.e. 
impaired verbal STM in tasks that emphasise semantic knowledge, with more preserved 
phonological STM. However, further testing (summarised in the next section) revealed that 
their STM deficits were symptomatic of a more general semantic control impairment which 
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affected all sufficiently demanding tasks, irrespective of stimulus modality or whether short-
term retention was involved. 
 JB was a 52 year-old man who left school at the age of 15 and was employed as a 
factory foreman. He suffered a left-hemisphere haemorrhagic CVA in April 2005. His 
language profile when assessed four months after the stroke was transcortical sensory aphasia. 
His speech was fluent and his ability to repeat verbal material was excellent but he displayed 
marked comprehension and word-finding difficulties. His language skills improved 
substantially after this initial period, such that at the time of the present study there were no 
obvious abnormalities in spontaneous speech or comprehension. A structural MRI scan was 
obtained, which revealed left hemisphere temporal damage (a series of coronal slices is shown 
in Figure 1). Loss of tissue was primarily along the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri 
(including the underlying white matter), and to a lesser extent the middle temporal gyrus. The 
superior temporal gyrus and sulcus were intact along their lengths.  
 ABU was a 54 year-old man who left school at the age of 15 and was employed in a 
local factory as a sheet metal worker until he experienced a CVA in June 2003. ABU initially 
presented with word-finding difficulty and mild comprehension problems, though his 
language abilities recovered after this initial period. When taking part in this study, his 
comprehension was good and his speech was fluent though punctuated by occasional 
hesitations and word-finding difficulties. His phrase length was slightly reduced. High-
resolution structural imaging was not available for this patient. In a CT scan obtained shortly 
after the infarct, the left lateral ventricle appeared enlarged and the grey-white matter contrast 
in the basal ganglia was reduced on the left side, which could indicate a diffuse left-
hemisphere partial infarction. 
 JHU was a 74 year-old man who left school aged 15 and spent most of his working 
life as an estate agent. He suffered a left hemisphere CVA in February 2008 and was referred 
to us in March 2009. We have no information on JHU’s acute presentation; however when the 
present study began (15 months post-CVA) he presented with fluent speech with occasional 
word-finding difficulties. He displayed no obvious comprehension or speech production 
deficits. We were unable to obtain structural imaging for this patient. 
 
Neuropsychological Profiles 
The patients have completed a range of tests assessing semantic knowledge and control, 
STM, visuospatial skills and general executive control. These tests are summarised below; 
some of these results are reported in more detail by Hoffman et al. (2009, 2011a). 
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Semantic Processing and Semantic Control 
Patients completed a battery of standard semantic tests (the Cambridge Semantic 
Memory battery; Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000) as well as 
more targeted assessments that probed semantic control abilities (Noonan, et al., 2010). 
Scores are shown in Table 1. The Cambridge Semantic Memory battery probes verbal and 
non-verbal semantic knowledge through tests of picture naming, spoken word-picture 
matching and verbal and pictorial semantic association. Performance on these tests was 
largely within the normal range, indicating that these patients did not have marked deficits in 
semantic processing per se. In contrast, evidence for impairments did emerge on the tests that 
targeted semantic control more specifically. First, when asked to produce items belonging to 
particular semantic categories (e.g., animals), all patients performed poorly. This task has 
high semantic control demands because it is open-ended and patients must develop an 
appropriate retrieval strategy to generate exemplars. Second, patients were susceptible to the 
following three manipulations of semantic control (described more fully in Hoffman et al., 
2011a). 
1. The patients’ comprehension of single words was close to normal when provided with 
a sentence that cued the meaning of the word. However, it was impaired when they 
had to overcome interference from a sentence that directed them towards an irrelevant 
aspect of the word’s meaning (e.g., they found it hard to match ball with bat when 
accompanied by the sentence “She wore her new dress to the ball”). 
2. They were impaired at detecting particular semantic relationships in the presence of 
irrelevant distracting information. In this task, patients were asked to select the 
synonym for a particular word while ignoring a non-synonymous but semantically 
related word (e.g., matching piece with slice in the presence of the distractor word 
cake). Semantic control is needed to focus on the relevant relationship while 
inhibiting interference from the distractor word. This deficit was most pronounced 
when the irrelevant association was particularly strong. 
3. They were good at matching similar objects when the items shared a close semantic 
relationship (e.g., hat and cap) but performed more poorly when the items were more 
distantly related (e.g., hat and shoe). The trials involving distant semantic 
relationships required greater control because more controlled interrogation of the 
items’ semantic representations was necessary to determine the connection between 
them. 
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These results indicate that while the patients showed little impairment in basic semantic 
processing, they were more impaired for tasks that demanded greater semantic control, either 
in terms of controlled processing of semantic knowledge or inhibition of irrelevant 
information. 
-Table 1 around here- 
 
Verbal Short-Term Memory 
 Patients completed a number of verbal STM assessments, summarised in Table 2 and 
described in more detail by Hoffman et al. (2009). Their digit spans and ability to repeat lists 
of nonwords were intact, indicating preservation of phonological STM capacity. This suggests 
that any deficits in working memory tasks cannot be attributed to poor phonological span. 
Recall of word lists was impaired in ABU and JHU, suggesting impairment to semantically-
mediated STM. JB performed within the normal range on word list repetition, but this result 
must be interpreted in the context of his extremely good performance on the equivalent 
nonword test. Accordingly, the size of the “lexicality effect” (i.e., the recall advantage for 
words over nonwords by virtue of their lexical-semantic status) was significantly reduced in 
JB as well as in the other two patients. In addition, all three patients demonstrated a strong 
dissociation between semantic and phonological STM on probe detection tasks (R. C. Martin, 
et al., 1994). These tasks require the detection of a word that shares either a phonological or 
semantic relationship with a probe. They performed normally on the phonological task but 
were impaired on the semantic version. In addition to its short-term maintenance demands, we 
have argued that this task has a strong semantic control requirement (Hoffman et al., 2009). 
-Table 2 around here- 
 
Visuospatial Skills 
 Table 2 also shows the patients’ scores on several components of the VOSP (Visual 
Object and Space Perception Battery; Warrington & James, 1991) and their direct copy of the 
Rey complex figure. These scores were all normal with the exception of ABU’s Rey copy, 
which fell very slightly outside the normal range. These findings indicate that any deficits on 
visually-mediated executive tasks are unlikely to be a result of basic perceptual impairment. 
 
Executive Function 
 We administered a battery of standardised tests designed to probe executive control 
functions. This consisted of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1992), the Trail-
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making test (Tombaugh, 2004), the Elevator Counting test from the Test of Everyday 
Attention (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994), the Stroop test, the 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (Stuss et al., 2000), the Hayling and Brixton tests (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997) and the Biber Cognitive Estimation test (Bullard et al., 2004). Table 3 shows 
results on these tests alongside published norms from healthy age-matched controls. There 
were no consistent signs of executive impairment on these tests. All the patients were within 
the normal range of the Raven’s non-verbal reasoning test, were able to complete the Elevator 
Counting task at a reasonable level while ignoring distracting information and showed normal 
interference effects on the Stroop test. However, JHU and ABU performed poorly on the 
executively-demanding portion of the Trail-making test (Part B, which involves connecting 
letters and numbers in an alternating sequence) and ABU was impaired on the Wisconsin 
card-sorting task: his category score of 3 was below the 10
th
 percentile and he took an 
abnormal number of trials to acquire the first category.  
JB was impaired on two tasks: the Hayling test and the Cognitive Estimation task. 
These tasks are notable because they both test executive regulation of semantic information. 
The Hayling test requires patients to complete sentences. In Part A, they are asked to supply 
an appropriate word to complete each sentence and in Part B to complete each sentence with a 
word that is unrelated to the sentence. JB made no errors on Part A, indicating intact 
comprehension and word retrieval, but was impaired on Part B, where executive control is 
needed to inhibit semantic information relating to the sentence and instead generate a novel 
response. In the Cognitive Estimation task, patients are asked to estimate quantities relating to 
familiar items that they would not be expected to know precisely (e.g., How many slices of 
bread are there in an average loaf?). This requires executive regulation to probe semantic 
knowledge in a flexible way and thereby generate a reasonable estimate. JB and ABU were 
both impaired on this test, with JHU also performing somewhat poorly. 
-Table 3 around here- 
 
Summary 
 The neuropsychological profiles of the three patients indicated deficits of semantic 
control combined with preserved visuospatial skills and preservation of phonological STM 
capacity (i.e., memory for digits and nonwords). In terms of executive function, no patient 
was consistently impaired on all of these tasks, though ABU and JHU displayed weakness on 
some tests, which might indicate a mild general executive deficit.  JB’s profile was 
particularly interesting: he failed only those tasks involving executive regulation in the 
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semantic domain, suggesting that his control deficit might be specific to semantic knowledge. 
In the remainder of the study, we investigated this possibility in more detail using a number of 
working memory tests designed to be sensitive to mild non-semantic executive deficits. 
 
Experiment 1: Strong vs. Weak Relationships in Phonological STM 
 In the first experiment, we sought evidence for sensitivity to executive demands in 
phonological processing. A number of studies have manipulated executive demands on 
semantic processing by varying the strength of the semantic relationship between two words 
(Badre, et al., 2005; Noonan, et al., 2010; Wagner, et al., 2001; Whitney, Kirk, et al., 2011). 
Likewise, the three patients described here were impaired in their ability to detect semantic 
relationships between distantly related items, particularly in the context of a demanding STM 
task (see Table 1 and Hoffman, Jefferies, et al., 2011). By analogy, we reasoned that the 
detection of weak phonological relationships would be more executively demanding than 
detecting items with greater phonological overlap. We designed a task based on the rhyming 
judgement task (R. C. Martin, et al., 1994), in which patients are presented with a word list 
and a probe and decide whether the probe rhymes with any of the list words. Background 
testing indicated that all three patients performed normally on this task (see Table 2). 
However, it is likely that rhyme detection has low executive demands because rhyming words 
are phonologically very similar and the overlapping rime unit is highly dominant in English 
(Treiman & Danis, 1988; Treiman & Kessler, 1995): for example, young children are better at 
segmenting words and detecting phonological similarity at the rime level than at the single 
phoneme level (Ziegler & Goswami, 2005). We contrasted rhyme detection with a more 
demanding phonological detection task in which the matching words shared only a single 
phoneme. We reasoned that detecting weaker phonological relationships is likely to involve 
greater controlled processing and therefore higher executive demands (in a similar fashion to 
weak semantic relationships). If the patients had domain-general executive deficits, we would 
expect to observe poorer performance on the single phoneme task relative to rhyme detection. 
However, neither task was dependent on semantic processing of the words, so a control deficit 
specific to semantics would not lead to impairment on either task. 
 
Method 
 Materials: Patients completed two phonological judgement tasks in which they were 
presented with an auditory list of CVC words and asked to decide whether a probe word was 
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phonologically related to any of them (see Table 4 for examples). For the rhyming task, they 
were asked to respond “yes” if the probe rhymed with any of the words from the list.  
For the phoneme task, they were asked to decide whether the probe contained any of the same 
phonemes as those in any of the words in the list. A match was present on half of the trials.  
The phoneme task was more difficult than the rhyme task in a number of ways: 
1. The matching word, when it was present, only shared a single phoneme with the 
probe, whereas rhyming words always shared two phonemes. This meant that the 
phonological relationship was weaker and less salient, and more detailed processing 
was needed to confirm the presence of a match. 
2. The shared phoneme could appear either at the start of the end of the word, whereas 
the overlap between the rhyming words was entirely predictable (i.e., always occurred 
at the end of the word). This meant that, in the shared phoneme condition, the patients 
had to direct attention to all elements of each word to decide whether a match was 
present. 
3. The shared phoneme could appear in different places in the two words (e.g., bat and 
cub). This manipulation meant that participants were required to identify two potential 
‘probe phonemes’ and then compare both of these with the list of potential targets, 
substantially increasing the requirement to maintain and manipulate phonological 
information in working memory. 
Word frequency, biphone frequency and neighbourhood density for the words used in each 
test are presented in Table 5. Mean values for probes, their matching targets and the non-
matching filler words are reported separately. T-tests indicated that the rhyme and phoneme 
tasks did not differ significantly for any of these values (t < 1.8, p > 0.05). 
 Procedure: Rhyme and phoneme tasks were completed on different days, following 
the same procedure. The task was first explained using a number of examples of matching and 
non-matching words. Patients were specifically instructed to pay attention to the sounds of the 
words, rather than how they were spelled. They were then presented with 24 pairs of words, 
read aloud by the experimenter, and asked whether each pair matched. This tested whether 
they understood the nature of the phonological judgements in each condition. Following this, 
they were presented with lists of 2, 3, 4 and 5 words, with 24 lists at each length. Lists were 
read out at a rate of one word per second and were followed immediately by the probe. The 
same lists were presented in the rhyming and phoneme conditions, but with different probes. 
 Control Participants: Sixteen healthy controls were recruited from the volunteer panel 
of the University of York. They had a mean age of 71 years (sd = 4.4; range = 62-78) and had 
13 
 
completed a mean of 12.3 years in formal education (sd = 2.0; range = 10-17). None had any 
history of neurological illness. 
 Data analysis: The control participants were well-matched in age to patient JHU but 
were somewhat older than JB and ABU. They also tended to have spent more time in formal 
education than the patients. To determine the degree to which these demographic factors 
could influence performance, we first computed the correlations of age and educational level 
with performance in each of the four conditions in the experiment. We then proceeded to 
compare each of the patients to the control group. In all experiments, impairment in a 
particular condition was inferred if there was a significant difference between the patient 
score and the controls, using Crawford and Howell’s (1998) modified t-test (one-tailed p < 
0.05). This is denoted in all figures with an asterisk. We also used the Revised Standardised 
Difference Test (RSTD; Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005) to determine whether patients showed 
an abnormally large dissociation between two conditions. This test indicates whether the 
difference between two conditions exhibited by a patient is significantly larger than that 
observed within the control group. 
-Table 4 around here- 
 
Results 
 Effects of age and educational level in control participants: Performance was not 
significantly correlated with age (|r| < 0.23, p > 0.4) or with educational level (|r| < 0.36, p > 
0.17) in any of the conditions, suggesting that these factors are unlikely to strongly influence 
performance in the experiment. Therefore, it was possible to compare each of our patients to 
the control group, despite them being slightly older and more highly educated than JB and 
ABU. 
 Evidence for impairment in the patients: Figure 2 shows correct responses to the word 
pairs and the word lists in each condition. None of the patients were impaired at judgements 
on word pairs, indicating that they understood the nature of the task and were capable of 
making both types of judgement accurately. Evidence of impairment was found, however, 
when the same judgements were made for longer lists of words. ABU and JHU were both 
marginally impaired when making the more demanding single phoneme judgements at the 
word list level (modified t-test: p = 0.06 in each case). No impairment was observed when the 
less demanding rhyme judgements were made to word lists. RSDT was used to assess 
whether a dissociation was present between rhyme judgements and single phoneme 
judgements for word lists. JHU showed such a dissociation (t(15) = 2.31, p = 0.018), 
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indicating that he was significantly more impaired for the single phoneme judgements than 
for the rhyme judgements (in fact, he scored slightly above the control mean in the rhyming 
condition). In contrast to the other patients, JB was unimpaired for both types of phonological 
judgement. He did not show a dissociation between rhyme judgements and single phoneme 
judgements. 
 
Discussion 
 ABU and JHU were both impaired when asked to make executively-demanding 
phonological judgements for lists of words. These deficits cannot be attributed to difficulty in 
comprehending the task or in basic phonological processing or segmentation, since both made 
the same judgements successfully to pairs of words. Background testing indicated that these 
patients do not have deficits to phonological storage per se (see Table 2). Instead, their poor 
performance may have been a consequence of the additional executive demands of detecting 
words that share a weak phonological relationship. Alternatively, their deficits may indicate 
very mild phonological processing deficits, which are only detectable on the most demanding 
tasks. In any case, this experiment demonstrates that both ABU and JHU have STM deficits 
that extend beyond the semantic domain.  
 In contrast, JB displayed no impairment on this task, even for the most demanding 
phonological judgements. Since JB shows clear deficits when required to detect weak 
semantic relationships, this suggests that his control deficit may be specific to the semantic 
domain. However, this conclusion must be considered with caution as the control participants 
were somewhat older than JB. Although performance was not correlated with age in the 
control group, it remains possible that a younger control group would have performed at a 
higher level. To address this issue, in the remaining experiments we recruited younger control 
participants who were matched in age to JB and ABU, as well as older individuals of similar 
age to JHU.  
 
Experiment 2: N-back Task 
 The n-back task is a working memory task commonly used to investigate executive 
function (e.g., Awh et al., 1996). Participants are presented with a single digit on each trial 
and are asked whether it is the same as the number presented n trials previously. When n=1 
this is relatively undemanding, as the participant simply has to compare the current digit to 
the one presented immediately before. As n increases, the executive demands of the task 
increase because the participant is required to recall digits from earlier trials whilst retaining 
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the intervening digits for use in later trials. In addition, the participant has to continuously 
update the memory set, discarding old trials while ensuring that new digits are encoded in the 
correct order. Here, we used 2-back and 3-back trials to assess non-semantic executive control 
in our patients, comparing these to the less demanding 1-back condition. 
 
Method 
 Task: Patients completed three versions of a running span task, each involving 
auditory presentation of single digits between 1 and 9. Patients completed the 1-back 
condition first. On each trial, the experimenter read aloud a single digit and the patient was 
asked whether it was the same or different to the digit read out on the previous trial. In the 2-
back and 3-back conditions, digits were presented singly as before but patients had to decide 
whether each digit was the same as the one presented either two or three trials previously. 
There was no time limit on responses and each condition consisted of 25 trials. Each 
condition was designed such that half of the trials required yes responses and half required no. 
 Control Participants: Sixteen healthy participants were recruited from the Manchester 
and York participant panels to take part in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. They were divided into 
two subgroups based on age, each containing eight participants. The younger control group 
were matched in age to JB and ABU: they had a mean age of 55 (sd = 6.5; range = 45-62). 
The older control group were matched to JHU and had a mean age of 70 (sd = 4.7; range = 
66-78). Educational level was 14.8 years on average in the younger group (sd = 2.8; range = 
12-19) and 13.6 years in the older group (sd = 2.9; range = 10-18). 
 Data analysis: The following procedures were adopted in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. To 
ensure that differences in age and educational level could not bias the results, we checked for 
correlations between these factors and task performance in each condition in the entire control 
group (N=16). Following this, we tested for evidence of impairment in each patient using 
modified t-tests. Tests were performed comparing each patient to the full group of 16 controls 
and to their own age-matched subgroup, with impairment only being assumed if both tests 
were significant. RSDT was used to assess the significance of dissociations between 
particular conditions. These tests were also performed against the full control group (denoted 
t1) and the patient’s age-matched subgroup (denoted t2). 
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Results 
 Effects of age and education:  Within the control group, there were no significant 
correlations between n-back performance and age (|r| < 0.31, p > 0.24) or with educational 
level (|r| < 0.08, p > 0.77), for any of the conditions. 
 Evidence for impairment in the patients: Results are shown in Figure 3. While all of 
the patients performed at ceiling in the 1-back condition, there were signs of impairment on 
the more executively demanding conditions. JHU responded at chance in the 2-back condition 
and could not attempt the 3-back condition. ABU was able to complete the 2-back condition 
successfully but dropped to chance in the 3-back condition. In contrast, JB’s performance was 
comparable to that of controls in all three conditions. RSDT confirmed that ABU showed a 
significantly larger difference between the 2-back and 3-back conditions than was observed in 
the controls (t1 = 2.61, p = 0.01; t2 = 1.95, p = 0.05). JB showed no such interaction (t1 = 1.05, 
p = 0.15; t2 = 0.75, p = 0.24). The statistical test could not performed for JHU as he did not 
complete the 3-back condition. He did, however, exhibit a striking dissociation between 100% 
accuracy in the 1-back condition and chance performance in the 2-back condition. 
-Figure 3 around here- 
 
Discussion 
 The n-back task revealed executive impairment in ABU and JHU. These deficits are 
unlikely to be a result of reduced phonological storage capacity, as both patients displayed 
preserved digit span and repetition of nonword lists in background testing. In contrast, JB 
showed no evidence of executive impairment, again indicating a dissociation between 
semantic and non-semantic control in his case. 
 
Experiment 3: Complex Memory Span 
 The ability to update representations in working memory and shift attention between 
two tasks are thought to be key aspects of executive function (Miyake, et al., 2000). In this 
experiment, we tested these abilities using two “complex span” tasks that required patients to 
encode and retain a series of stimuli while simultaneously completing an unrelated task 
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). As in the previous experiment, we focused on 
retention of stimuli that have little intrinsic semantic significance: numbers and letters. In the 
Counting Span task, patients attempted to recall digits while completing a ‘distracting’ visual 
search task. They were presented with a visual display and asked to count how many of a 
particular type of shape were present and remember this total. After seeing a series of such 
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displays, they were asked to recall the totals from each display. Thus, in this task, both the 
STM component and the distracting material were non-semantic. In the Reading Span task, 
patients were presented with a series of sentences and decided whether each one made sense. 
Each sentence was followed by a letter of the alphabet that they were instructed to remember. 
After seeing a series of sentence-letter pairs, they tried to recall the letters. This test examined 
the effect on irrelevant semantic processing on the retention on non-semantic verbal 
information in STM.  
 
Method 
 We used the verbal response versions of the complex span tasks developed by 
Unsworth et al. (2005), the code for which is available on the following website: 
http://psychology.gatech.edu/renglelab/Eprime1.html. They were presented using a laptop 
computer running Eprime software. 
Counting Span: On each trial, patients saw a series of visual displays consisting of 
squares and circles in two colours (light and dark blue) on a grey background. For each 
display, they were asked to count the number of dark blue circles present in the display and to 
say aloud and remember this total. A number of such displays were presented sequentially, 
followed by a cue to recall. Upon seeing the cue, the participant attempted to recall the totals 
for all the displays they had just seen, in the order in which they were presented. Following 
recall, the next trial began with a new series of displays. There were between two and six 
displays on each trial and there were 15 trials in total. There was no time limit placed on 
responses. 
Reading Span: On each trial, participants saw a series of written sentences, each 
followed by a single upper-case letter. They were asked to each the sentence aloud and decide 
whether it was meaningful. Half of the sentences were meaningful and half contained an 
inappropriate word (e.g., “Raising children requires a lot of dust and the ability to be firm”). 
After making the sentence decision, they were asked to read the letter aloud and attempt to 
remember it. Upon doing so, the display was updated to show a new sentence and letter. This 
process was repeated until a cue to recall was presented, at which point the patient attempted 
to recall the letters in the order in which they were presented. Each trial consisted of between 
two and five sentences/letters, for a total of 12 trials. 
 For both tasks, the proportion of letters or digits correctly recalled on each trial was 
calculated. We also recorded performance on the distracting tasks. 
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 Control Participants: The sixteen participants from Experiment 2 took part in this 
experiment. 
 
Results 
  Effects of age and education:  Within the control group, there were no significant 
correlations between performance and age (|r| < 0.12, p > 0.65) or with educational level (|r| < 
0.40, p > 0.12), for either task. 
 Evidence for impairment in the patients: Results for patients and healthy controls are 
shown in Figure 4. ABU and JHU were impaired on significantly impaired on both tasks but 
JB was not significantly impaired on either. RSDT indicated that there was no dissociation 
between the two tasks in JB (t1 = 0.60, p = 0.28; t2 = 0.12, p = 0.46) or JHU (t1 = 0.97, p = 
0.17; t2 = 0.69, p = 0.26). A significant dissociation was present in ABU, though only when 
he was compared to the younger control subgroup (t1 = 0.18, p = 0.43; t2 = 1.92, p = 0.048). 
Though ABU was impaired on both tasks, this result suggests that his impairment may have 
been more severe on the counting span task.   
 Performance on the distracting tasks was good in all cases. All patients correctly 
counted the shapes on at least 85% of occasions (JB = 95%; ABU = 85%; JHU = 95%; 
control mean = 96%) and responded correctly to over 90% of the sentences (JB = 98%; ABU 
= 93%; JHU = 95%; control mean = 99%). 
 
-Figure 4 around here- 
 
Discussion 
 This experiment provided further evidence for general executive deficits in ABU and 
JHU. Both showed impaired letter and digit recall under executively demanding conditions. In 
contrast, background testing indicated that when tested without distracting concurrent tasks, 
these patients had digit spans within the normal range. Again, JB showed no evidence of 
executive impairment when recalling materials with minimal semantic content, suggesting a 
dissociation between semantic control and general executive function in his case. It is worth 
noting that although the sentence judgements were based on semantic knowledge, they were 
very easy and the yes/no response format was likely to minimise any semantic control 
requirement. In fact, JB performed at the lower end of the control range on this task, perhaps 
indicating a small contribution of semantic control. 
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Experiment 4: Manipulation vs. Storage of Letter Lists 
 Processing and manipulation of items in working memory is thought to be more 
executively demanding than passive storage (Belleville, Rouleau, & Caza, 1998; Collette et 
al., 1999; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). In the final experiment, we varied 
executive demands by asking participants to manipulate letter sequences held in working 
memory in different ways. We again used letters as they have little intrinsic semantic content. 
In the first, low-control condition, patients were asked to recall letter strings exactly as 
presented. This verbatim repetition required no manipulation or processing of the letters, so 
was not expected to strongly engage executive processes. In the remaining two conditions, 
patients were asked to manipulate the order of the letters before recalling them, increasing 
executive demands. In a backward recall condition, patients were asked to reverse the order of 
the letter string. This required additional processing of the contents of working memory but 
there was no need to access stored knowledge. In a final, alphabetical condition, patients were 
asked to reproduce the letters in alphabetical order (Belleville, et al., 1998). This condition 
required participants to use their acquired knowledge of the alphabet to regulate their 
response. It is not clear whether knowledge of the alphabet is supported by semantic memory 
or whether it relies on other cognitive systems (for example, since the alphabet is a well-
learned auditory sequence, it may rely on phonological coding). However, we included this 
condition because, in common with semantic control tasks, it requires manipulation of items 
held in working memory based on stored long-term knowledge of their properties. 
 
Method 
 Task: Participants were presented with auditory sequences of letters and attempted to 
recall them in one of three ways. In the forward recall condition, they reproduced the string of 
letters exactly as presented. In the backward recall condition, they were asked to recall the 
letters in the reverse order to that presented. In the alphabetical condition, they attempted to 
recall the letters in alphabetical order. These three conditions were interspersed, with a verbal 
cue on each trial indicating how to recall the letters (“forward”, “backward” or 
“alphabetical”). The timing of the cue varied: on half of the trials it was given prior to 
presentation of the letters and on the remaining half immediately after. Recall began 
immediately after presentation of the cue and letter string. All patients received strings 
containing five letters, for a total of 48 trials. However, ABU performed somewhat poorly on 
these even for forward recall, so was also tested with 48 lists of four letters. The proportion of 
letters recalled in the correct sequence was used as a measure of accuracy. 
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To test knowledge of the alphabet, patients also completed a two-alternative forced 
choice alphabetic ordering task. On each trial, patients were visually presented with two 
letters and asked which came first in the alphabet. There were 28 trials.  
Control Participants: Fifteen of the sixteen participants from Experiments 2 and 3 also 
took part in this experiment. One participant from the older subgroup was unavailable. All 
control participants completed the five-letter lists. Seven of the younger controls also 
completed the four-letter lists, providing a matched control group for ABU. 
 
Results 
 Effects of age and education:  Within the control group, there were no significant 
correlations between performance and age (|r| < 0.22, p > 0.41) or with educational level (|r| < 
0.17, p > 0.53), for forward, backward or alphabetical recall. 
 Evidence for impairment in the patients: Accuracy for forward, backward and 
alphabetical recall of five-letter lists is shown in Figure 5A. The timing of the cue had little 
effect on performance so results were averaged over pre- and post- presentation cues. RSDT 
was used to test for dissociations between particular conditions, relative to controls. Patient 
JB showed a selective deficit for recall in alphabetical order. He showed no dissociation 
between forward and backward recall (t1 = 0.68, p = 0.25; t2 = 0.70, p = 0.25) but did display a 
larger difference than controls for forward vs. alphabetical (t1 = 3.90, p < 0.001; t2 = 3.47, p = 
0.005) and backward vs. alphabetical recall (t1 = 3.81, p < 0.001; t2 = 2.67, p = 0.016). In 
contrast, JHU showed preserved forward recall but was impaired at backward and 
alphabetical recall. He showed an abnormal dissociation between both forward and backward 
(t1 = 4.07, p < 0.001; t2 = 3.81, p = 0.004) and forward and alphabetical memory (t1 = 5.26, p 
< 0.001; t2 = 4.28, p = 0.003). He also exhibited a dissociation between backward and 
alphabetical recall, but only when compared to his age-matched subgroup (t1 = 1.24, p = 0.12; 
t2 = 4.12, p = 0.003). This suggests that his alphabetical recall was even more severely 
impaired than his backward recall. 
 Finally, ABU performed worst of the three patients and was significantly impaired in 
all three conditions. He did not show any significant dissociations between conditions. 
However, because he performed poorly on forwards recall, we also tested him with easier 
four-letter lists (see Figure 5B). On these lists, his performance was more similar to that of 
JHU: forward recall was not impaired but backward and alphabetical recall were. There was a 
significant dissociation for forward vs. backward (t = 4.59, p = 0.002) and forward vs. 
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alphabetical (t = 2.60, p = 0.02) but no effect for backward vs. alphabetical (t = 0.91, p = 
0.20). 
 On the forced-choice alphabetical knowledge test, JB and JHU both scored 28/28, 
indicating that their knowledge of the alphabet was intact. ABU was somewhat less 
successful, scoring only 24/28. This could explain why he did poorly on the alphabetical 
recall condition. 
-Figure 5 around here- 
 
Discussion 
 This experiment produced further evidence for a highly specific executive control 
deficit in patient JB. He performed well when reversing the order of letter strings, indicating 
preserved executive function when required to manipulate the contents of working memory. 
However, he was not able to perform order manipulations based on his stored knowledge of 
the alphabet. This dissociation cannot be explained in terms of task difficulty because controls 
performed equally well in alphabetical and backwards conditions. Nor was it a result of 
impaired knowledge of the alphabetical order of letters. Instead, JB appeared to have specific 
difficulty using his intact alphabetical knowledge to direct his responses. This is similar to the 
semantic control deficits observed in this patient previously, in which he appeared to have 
intact semantic knowledge but difficulty controlling retrieval of this knowledge such that it 
was appropriate to the current task or context. In contrast, ABU and JHU were equally 
impaired at backwards and alphabetical recall, suggesting they had a more general executive 
deficit, affecting their ability to perform any kind of online manipulation of the contents of 
working memory. 
 
General Discussion 
 The ability to access semantic knowledge in a flexible and context-appropriate way, 
referred to here as ‘semantic control’, is a critical aspect of semantic cognition. Neuroimaging 
evidence indicates that the neural substrate of semantic control at least partially overlaps with 
that of executive control in other domains, suggesting that a common system might govern all 
forms of cognitive control (Duncan, 2010; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Jefferies & Lambon 
Ralph, 2006). In line with this view, in two cases with relatively ‘pure’ semantic control 
deficits, we found evidence that non-semantic aspects of executive processing were also 
impaired. However, in a third patient, JB, there was a clear dissociation between semantic and 
non-semantic control. This individual was able to perform the key executive functions of 
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updating and manipulation of information in working memory, as well as dividing attention 
between two tasks, provided that these operations did not involve semantic knowledge. 
Conversely, his ability to perform controlled processing on semantic information was 
impaired. This suggests that semantic control depends at least partially on unique resources 
not required for other forms of executive processing.  
 Before turning to the theoretical implications of these results, we will consider some 
alternative explanations for why JB should show a different profile to the other two patients. 
JB performs slightly better than ABU and JHU on semantic tasks in general (see Table 1), so 
one possibility is that the observed differences are a result of severity. It could be that all three 
patients have a domain-general executive impairment but that, because JB’s deficit is the 
mildest, we have failed to detect it in this study. This explanation would need to take into 
account the fact that in our previous study, JB did show significant impairment on a number 
of executively demanding semantic judgements (Hoffman, Jefferies, et al., 2011). However, it 
could be that the tasks in the present study are less demanding than those we used previously 
to assess semantic control, and therefore less sensitive to mild impairments. This is unlikely 
because the tasks in the present study were designed to be challenging even for healthy 
participants; indeed, in each experiment the control group only achieved around 80% 
accuracy in the most difficult condition. Thus, while one would expect even the mildest 
impairment to disrupt performance on these tasks, no deficits were detected in JB. In contrast, 
in our previous study of semantic control, healthy subjects performed close to ceiling in each 
experiment (typically above 95% accurate) yet JB was impaired on these easier tasks. We are 
confident, therefore, that JB’s profile is not a result of differential task sensitivity. 
 Another possibility is that JB has a mild deficit in semantic knowledge that prevents 
him from performing normally on semantic tasks. This theory is supported by the extent of his 
lesion which, in addition to affecting an area of the left pMTG associated with semantic 
control (discussed below), extends rostrally to include the anterior fusiform. Bilateral damage 
to this area is associated with the progressive degradation of semantic knowledge in semantic 
dementia (Mion et al., 2010) and unilateral lesions can sometimes result in mild impairments 
(Lambon Ralph, Cipolotti, Manes, & Patterson, 2010). Perhaps JB’s semantic knowledge 
store has been subtly disrupted, affecting only the most demanding semantic tasks.  In 
Experiment 4, we investigated the issue of knowledge storage vs. controlled regulation. JB 
showed fully intact knowledge of the alphabet but was still drastically impaired in the 
alphabetical recall condition. This suggests that his deficit on this task stemmed not from loss 
of knowledge but from an inability to use his knowledge to regulate behaviour. 
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 The dissociation between semantic and non-semantic control in patient JB suggests 
that at least some aspects of the neural and cognitive architecture underpinning executive 
control are specialised for processing semantic knowledge. This is perhaps not surprising, 
given that semantic memory comprises a vast and rich store of information that is central to 
our interaction with the environment. It does not necessarily imply that the neural 
underpinnings of semantic control are entirely independent of those for executive processing 
in other domains. Indeed, a large body of neuroimaging evidence suggests that regions of 
prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex are reliably activated for executively demanding tasks 
across a range of processing domains (Collette, et al., 2006; Duncan, 2006; Duncan & Owen, 
2000; Nee, et al., 2007). Duncan and colleagues refer to these as “multiple demand” regions 
and suggest that they are recruited whenever task-dependent controlled processing is required, 
irrespective of the task involved (Duncan, 2010). Neuroimaging studies of semantic control 
reveal similar activations, most consistently in the inferior frontal gyrus but also in inferior 
parietal cortex (Badre, et al., 2005; Rodd, et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill, et al., 1997; Wagner, 
et al., 2001), suggesting that “multiple demand” regions are also involved in controlled 
semantic processing.  
 In addition to this shared neural substrate, some regions have been selectively 
associated with controlled processing in semantic tasks. Posterior middle temporal gyrus 
(pMTG) is often activated in manipulations of high vs. low semantic control (Bedny, et al., 
2008; Gold, et al., 2006; Noppeney, et al., 2004; Rodd, et al., 2005; Whitney, Jefferies, et al., 
2011) and TMS applied to this region slows executively demanding semantic judgements, 
with no commensurate effect on executively demanding perceptual decisions (Whitney, Kirk, 
et al., 2011).  However, this region is not implicated in the "multiple demand" system. 
Likewise, the anterior portion of inferior prefrontal cortex (BA45/47) responds strongly to 
manipulations of semantic control but not to executively demanding tasks in other domains 
(Gold & Buckner, 2002; Gough, et al., 2005; Nagel, et al., 2008; Snyder, et al., 2007). Two 
recent TMS studies have also shown that stimulation of this region slows executively 
demanding semantic decisions with no effect on matched visual or numerical tasks (Hoffman, 
Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010; Whitney, Kirk, et al., 2011). A recent formal meta-analysis 
of semantic control studies supports these findings (Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon 
Ralph, submitted). While a number of regions were found to be consistently activated in high 
vs. low semantic control contrasts across studies, only anterior, inferior prefrontal cortex and 
pMTG were more active for semantic control than for non-semantic executive control. 
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 The most likely cause of the semantic-specific control deficit in patient JB is damage 
to pMTG, as his lesion does not affect prefrontal or parietal cortex (see Figure 1). It is more 
difficult to ascertain the cause of the more general executive deficits in patients ABU and 
JHU, as high-resolution imaging was not available for these patients, but it seems possible 
that damage affects one or more “multiple demand” regions required for domain-general 
controlled processing. The main contribution of this study, however, is not to provide precise 
anatomical localisation of the semantic control network. Instead this study, along with the 
TMS studies discussed earlier, indicates that with selective damage to elements of the 
semantic control network, a behavioural dissociation between semantic and non-semantic 
control can be observed. This confirms some regions of cortex are critical for control and 
regulation of semantic knowledge but are not involved in other forms of controlled 
processing. Future studies should clarify the precise functions of semantic-specific control 
regions vs. domain-general “multiple demand” regions, since it is likely that interaction 
between the various components of this distributed network is necessary to give rise to 
appropriate, semantically-driven behaviour.
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Table 1: Tests of semantic processing and control 
 
 Max JB ABU JHU Healthy 
control 
mean 
Range 
General Semantics 
a
       
Naming 64 58* 63 61 62.3 57-64 
Word-picture matching 64 64 61* 64 63.8 63-64 
Camel and Cactus test       
Words 64 62 57 59 60.7 56-63 
Pictures 64 59 57 49* 59.1 51-62 
Semantic Control       
Category fluency (8 
categories) 
- 62* 58* 56* 121.5 75-162 
Single word comprehension       
    Appropriate cue 60 58* 58* 58* 59.8 59-60 
    Inappropriate cue 60 48* 42* 51* 59 57-60 
Ignoring irrelevant distractors       
   Weak distractors 42 41 28* 33* 41.5 41-42 
   Strong distractors 42 36 24* 24* 39.9 36-42 
Matching similar objects       
   Closely related 64 61* 62* 63* 64 64-64 
   Distantly related 64 56* 47* 50* 62.6 59-64 
* denotes abnormal scores. 
a
 Cambridge Semantic Memory Battery (Bozeat, et al., 2000).
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Table 2: Tests of short-term memory and visuospatial skills 
 
 Max JB ABU JHU Healthy 
control 
mean 
Range 
Short-term memory 
a
       
Digit span        
   Forwards 8 7 5 7 6.8 5-8 
   Backwards 8 4 4 3 4.7 3-7 
Nonword lists % 57 32 29 28.9 18-46 
Word lists % 80 50* 40* 69.4 58-87 
     Lexicality effect % 23* 18* 11* 40.6 34-51 
Rhyme judgement span 9 8 6 9 6.98 4.7-9 
Category judgement span 7 2.7* 2.7* 2* 6.15 4.7-7 
Visuospatial skills       
VOSP 
b
       
   Incomplete letters 20 20 19 19 18.8 16 
   Number location 10 10 10 9 9.4 7 
   Cube analysis 10 10 9 10 9.2 6 
Rey figure copy 36 33 29* NT 34 30 
* denotes abnormal scores. 
a
 See Hoffman et al. (2009) for further details of these tests.  
b
 Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (Warrington & James, 1991). 
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Table 3: Tests of executive control 
 
 Test JB ABU JHU 
Healthy 
control 
mean 
Impaired 
cut-off 
Raven Standard Progressive Matrices /60 36 34 36 50 < 27 
Trails Test      
      Part A completion time 51 42 42 32 > 51 
      Part B completion time 75 180* 100* 64 > 93 
TEA Elevator counting      
      No distraction /7 7 7 7 6.6 < 6 
      With distraction /10 10 5 8 8.2 < 4 
Stroop test      
      Word reading 88 63* 72 108 < 68 
      Colour naming 94 56 49* 80 < 50 
      Conflict condition 39 26 39 45 < 25 
      Interference effect -6 -4 11 0 < -20 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test      
      Categories achieved /6 6 3 4     
      Category %ile range > 16th 6-10th > 16th     
      Errors made /128 15 50 57 27 > 64 
      Trials to first category 12 30* 10   > 19 
Brixton Test of Spatial Anticipation /54 41 30 32 37 < 29 
Hayling test      
      Section A errors 0 1 0     
      Section B errors 40* 1 3 10 > 30 
Biber Cognitive Estimation test /20 12* 14* 15 18.1 < 15 
* denotes abnormal scores. Stroop scores age-adjusted. TEA = Test of everyday attention 
(Robertson, et al., 1994). 
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Table 4: Example Trials in Experiment 1 
 
Condition List Probe Correct Response 
Rhyme dame, vile, note  trial Yes 
Rhyme fog, limb, cage pool No 
Phoneme buzz, cod, wheat wedge Yes (shares <w>) 
Phoneme bait, pad, mark lord Yes (shares <d>) 
Phoneme guess, nape, hush seat  Yes (shares <s>) 
Phoneme curve, pug, ten soul No 
 
The matching word on “yes” trials is shown in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Psycholinguistic Properties of Words for Experiment 1 
 
 
Property Words Phoneme test Rhyme test 
Log word frequency
 a
 Probes 1.25 (0.71) 1.25 (0.75) 
 Targets 1.44 (0.73) 1.29 (0.67) 
 Fillers 1.36 (0.77) 1.39 (0.77) 
Biphone frequency
 b
 Probes 869 (1266) 768 (1008) 
 Targets 825 (825) 821 (1047) 
 Fillers 1084 (1582) 1084 (1586) 
Phonological neighbourhood density
 c
 Probes 1.19 (0.26) 1.26 (0.28) 
 Targets 1.20 (0.28) 1.20 (0.26) 
 Fillers 1.21 (0.26) 1.21 (0.26) 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
a
 from CELEX (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van 
Rijn, 1993). 
b
 obtained using N-watch (Davis, 2005). 
c
 Levenshtein distance (Yarkoni, Balota, 
& Yap, 2008).  
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Figure 1: Coronal MRI Slices for Patient JB 
 
 
 
Image is in radiological convention (left on right) 
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Figure 2: Phonological STM Tasks 
 
 
† denotes marginally impaired performance (modified t-test; p = 0.06).  
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Figure 3: N-Back Task 
 
 
 
Asterisks denote significantly impaired performance (modified t-test; p < 0.05).
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Figure 4: Counting and Reading Span Results 
 
 
 
 
Asterisks indicate significantly impaired performance (modified t-test; p < 0.05).
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Figure 5: Letter Recall Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asterisks denote significantly impaired performance (modified t-test; p < 0.05). 
(A) Five letters 
(B) Four letters 
